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AESTHETICS IN ZONING
By CHARLES P. LiGHT*, JR.
F a recent prediction that "the year 2000 will find the United
States with a population of nearly 200,000,000, largely segre-
gated in enormous decentralized cities . . ." with "the possi-
bility of a narrow strip of land along the Atlantic seaboard
becoming . . an almost continuous city from Portland, Me.,
to Washington,"' approach fulfilment, present problems of zoning
attain greater importance. Compilations for 1928 show that
"more than 37,000,000 people . . . comprising three-fifths of
the urban population of the United States"2 live in zoned munici-
palities. Scarcely a day passes without some comment dealing
with one of the phases of the subject appearing in the metro-
politan dailies: "Today house developers of their own initiative
are placing restrictions in covenants running with titles to resi-
dences even more detailed and stringent"" than are found in
zoning laws. Developments in the United States have elicited the
expression that "England should not fall behind America in
promoting the kind of education and scientific work needed to
develop the resources of the country by means of regional and
town planning." 4
*Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University,
School of Law, Lexington, Va.
'The Evening Star (hereafter cited The Star), Washington, D. C.,
July 27, 1929, p. 12, headline "Population of U. S. To Be 187,000,000 By
Year of 2000." The signed article epitomizes a study by Frederic A.
Delano and Dr. John M. Gries.2Department of Commerce mimeographed compilation by Norman
L. Knauss, Zoned Municipalities in the United States 1.
The Star, July 27, 1929, p. 13.
4
"Letters to the Editor," The Times, London, England, July 13,
1929, p. 10.
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Not all minds are agreed upon the advisability of zoning laws.
Mr. Newton D. Baker, counsel in the Euclid Case,' states an
objection in these careful words:
"That our cities should be made beautiful and orderly is, of
course, in the highegt degree desirable, but it is even more impor-
tant that our people should remain free. Their freedom depends
upon the preservation of their constitutional immunities and
privileges against the desire of others to control them, no matter
how generous the motive or well intended the control which it is
sought to impose." 6
Another, less mild, perceives in zoning laws the introduction of
"a destructive socialistic program under the terms of constitu-
tionalism ''7 and believes "the fact that zoning is anticonstitu-
tional .. . is readily inferred from the confessions of the pro-
fessional zoners themselves."" However, the Supreme Court has
squarely sustained the constitutionality of the comprehensive
zoning ordinance in its general scope;' of the exclusion of a four-
family flat building from a restricted residence district;10 of the
exclusion of a business building from a residence district ;"' of a
set-back regulation."
5(1926) 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303.
6(1926) 272 U. S. 365, 379, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 3D3.
'Wm. P. Gest, The Principles of Zoning 11. "Delivered before
the Forum of the Philadelphia Chapter of the American Institute of
Banking."
8Wm. P. Gest, The Principles of Zoning 11, 36. The preceding
sentence reads: "Solicitor General Beck has drawn a useful distinc-
tion between acts which are juridically unconstitutional and those
which are politically anti-constitutional."
vVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 365,
47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303.
I°Beery v. Houghton, (1927) 273 U. S. 671, 47 Sup. Ct. 474, 71
L. Ed. 832. Per Curiam.
I-Zahn v. Board of Public Works, (1927) 274 U. S. 325, 47 Sup.
Ct. 594, 71 L. Ed. 1074.
12Gorieb v. Fox, (1927) 274 U. S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct. 675, 71 L. Ed.
1228. This case and those cited in notes 9, 10, 11 are discussed by
Alfred Bettman in Note, C1928) 2 U. Cin. L. Rev. 314.
One zoning decision, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, (1928) 277
U. S. 183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447, 72 L. Ed. 842 was handed down during Oct.
Term 1927. It held that the action of the Cambridge, Massachusetts
authorities in placing plaintiff's land in a residence district, under the
particular circumstances, came "within the ban of the fourteenth
amendment" and could not be sustained. Noted in (1928) 8 B. U. L.
Rev. 330.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, (1928) 278 U. S, 116, 49 Sup. Ct.
50 holds invalid a consent ordinance, as applied to the erection of a philan-
thropic home in a residence district.
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PROBLEMS
The reasons for zoning are thus summed up by Helen Mar-
garet Werner in her brochure on the constitutionality of zoning
regulations :'s
"(1) the need for preserving the general character of dis-
tricts, as residence or business districts; (2) the recognized evil of
congestion, which demands regulations for congested areas which
are not needed elsewhere; and (3) the enormous loss due to build-
ing obsolescence, resulting from lack of adaptation to function."
Assuming that it is not implied in (1), why is a fourth reason-
the aesthetic improvement of municipalities-not given? (a)
Must it be said that aesthetic considerations alone are insuf-
ficient as a basis for the exercise of police power in the form of
zoning laws?'4 (b) Does the inclusion of such considerations
invalidate an otherwise -valid law ?1-5 This paper is concerned with
what the courts and writers have said on these questions, with
what the courts have done which throws light upon them.
It is possible that the very term aesthetic ("appreciative of
the beautiful, or in accord with its principles") incites the com-
mon-law trained judge to squirm. He-in Ohio, she, as well-is
afraid perhaps that the epithet aesthete ("one who makes much
or overmuch of the sense of the beautiful") will be hurled at
him. In so many cases does the word aesthetic appear, however,
that no advantage would be gained by discarding it. Better it
is to embrace it with circumspect courage.
The major question put above speaks of aesthetic considera-
tions alone. The difficulty arising from the use of "alone" in a
police power discussion is apparent. Subsequent discussion will
develop the accuracy of its use.
To restate any of the various attempted definitions of the
police power would scarcely prove helpful. This "inherent"
power of the state extends at least to the enactment of measures
affecting the public health, safety, morals. Some add, the public
welfare and convenience. Whether the sustained exercises of
power necessitate a broadening of definition must stand over
till later.
'
3 Werner, The Constitutionality of Zoning Regulations 9. Uni-
versity of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences.
14Referred to infra as "major question," "primary question,"
"Question (a)."15 Referred to infra as "subsidiary question," "Question (b)."
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In the closing days of 1927 a Washington newspaper'" thus
headlined a front-page story: "Fine Arts Victor In Fight On
Cigar Store's Building." Legally, the fight was a figment. A
corporation intended to erect its new building opposite the pro-
jected group of monumental federal buildings. The fine arts
commission objected to the style of the building, alleging it
would clash with the design of the government structures. There
was a conference and the company voluntarily revised its plans
to conform to the views of the commission. But suppose that
Fine Arts had met with opposition and assume a grant of power
by Congress to approve or disapprove plans without compensa-
tion,1 7 would the headline have read the same? Professor Van
Hecke has this to say:
"No one seriously contends, however, that zoning legislation
[under the police power] would either be enacted or upheld if it
attempted to prescribe requirements as to the minimum cost or
architectural design of buildings, or the shape and landscaping
of lots. These factors can be handled only by private contracts."18
Let us see.
DATA
I
"The entire field of zoning outside of the subject of use has
been upheld by the courts throughout this country. This embraces
the subjects of height, area and bulk, courts and yards."'' The
Massachusetts supreme court has done pioneer work in sustain-
ing maximum height regulations under the police power. There
is a recognized aesthetic interest in such limitations. As the
Supreme Court, affirming a Massachusetts judgment, 20 puts it:
16The Star, December 8, 1927.
17 The Star, December 5, 1927, p. 2, under the headline, "Planning
Avenue Building Program," says: "A bill designed to give the Com-
mission of Fine Arts and the National Capital Park and Planning
Commission authority to approve or disapprove types of construction
of private structures which face on or impinge upon public buildings
was introduced in the Senate at the last session of Congress by Senator
Shipstead of Minnesota, and is 'to be reintroduced at the session which
began today."
It is not stated whether the authority was to be exercised under
police or under eminent domain power.
Is M. T. Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds,(1928) 37 Yale L. 3. 407, 410.
l9Department of Commerce mimeographed study of Edward M.
Bassett, Zoning and the Courts 3. Mr. G. Topham Forrest, the
architect to the London County Council in his, Report on Construction
and Control of Buildings and Development of Urban Areas in the
United States of America 66, refers to "Mr. Edward M. Bassett, who
is recognized as the highest legal authority on Zoning in America."
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"That in addition to these sufficient facts, considerations of an
aesthetic nature also entered into the reasons for their passage,
would not invalidate them."121
Aesthetics is given a back seat. Though "very powerful" 2 with
the legislature or council which enacted the laws, the courts
utilize the familiar to sustain them. The public safety, they say,
is protected against the fire hazard inherent to the tall structure.
Adequate light and air conserve the public health. True enough,
but it must seem passing strange to the layman that the reason
which motivated his agitation for the law is either ignored by the
courts or minimized. However, "in law as elsewhere actions
speak louder than words." So no doubt, he will believe "that in
fact the reasonable promotion of the aesthetic is a vital factor"
which the courts "consciously, subconsciously or unconsciously"23
are employing to sustain such regulations.
The maximum height cases give us an early answer to our
subsidiary question: the inclusion of aesthetic reasons does not
invalidate a law sustainable on orthodox grounds. But they shed
no light on our primary question.
Nor is much to be gleaned concerning it from the area cases.
Reasonable area restrictions have been sustained, usually by
invoking the ancient reasons. The Connecticut court goes further,
in a case upholding the establishment of building lines, when it
says:
"Such a plan is wise provision for the future. It betters the
health and safety of the community; ... it adds to the appear-
ance and wholesomeness of the place, and as a consequence it reacts
upon the morals and spiritual power of the people who live under
such surroundings. 24
We should like to, but cannot know what part "appearance and
wholesomeness" played in the final result. Maybe an important
one, for the court seems to deprecate the fact that "our large
communities all have their examples of . . . community eye-
sores."
25
20 Welch v. Swasey, (1907) 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745.
2 tWelch v. Swasey, (1909) 214 U. S. 91, 108, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 53
L. Ed. 923.
22 (1925) 13 Calif. L. Rev. 417, 418.
23 Legal Limitation on Municipal Beautification, (1924) 30 W. Va.
L. Q. 191.24Windsor v. Whitney, (1920) 95 Conn. 357, 363, 111 Atl. 354.
Noted (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 327.25(1920) 95 Conn. 357, 363, 111 Atl. 354.
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II
It is in the field of zoning for use that courts pronouncedly
disagree upon the scope of police power. In the case of the non-
nuisance uses it has proved difficult to classify under the formal
labels, health, safety, morals. Consequently, while the creation
of use districts "in general" is constitutional, the exclusion of
certain types of structures from restricted areas-stores from
residence districts, apartment houses from one-family districts-"
has not been unanimously sustained. In part, this lack of unan-
imity has provoked expressions which bear importantly on our
problems.
First to be considered are the cases which construe the police
power broadly, sustain the questioned exclusions, seem favorable
to aesthetics.
In Ware v. City of Wichita,"7 the Kansas court sustained the
proscription of a business building from a residence district. In
answer to the objection that the zoning law depreciated the value
of plaintiff's property, it said:
"With the march of the times, however, the scope of the
legitimate exercise of the police power is not so narrowly
restricted by judicial interpretation as it used to be. There is an
aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which may
be fostered within reasonable limitations . . . Such legislation is
merely a liberalized application of the general welfare purposes
of state and federal constitutions.
2 8
The Kansas attitude seems to be: reasonable aesthetic considera,
tions alone are a sufficient basis, but it is better to justify an
exercise of police power under the niore familiar phrase, general
welfare. The accuracy of this description is substantiated by
further remarks of Davison, J.:
"The writer of a timely article, 'The Attitude of the Law
Toward Beauty,' in the American Bar Association Journal for
August, 1922, p. 470, et seq., urges that aesthetic considerations
be recognized as sufficient in themselves to justify reasonable
municipal regulations governing the use of property without
resorting to some attenuated theory that such regulations have
to do with health, safety, or morals....
26 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., (1926) 272 U. S.
365, 390, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303. "This question involves the
validity of what is really the crux of the more recent zoning legislation,
namely, the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from
which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment
houses, are excluded."
27 (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99. See (1924) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 443.
28 (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 Pac. 99.
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"It cannot be denied, however, that there is good ground
for the view that a reasonable zoning ordinance has some perti-
nent relation to the health, safety, morals and general welfare
of the community." -9
Pertinent remarks are found in the Minnesota case, State ex
rel. T-win City B. & T. Co. v. Houghton, which involved the
exclusion of an apartment building from a residence zone under
a law providing for compensation. However, the decision is in
point on the police power, for, as the court points out in a later
case:
"the last prevailing opinion in State v. Houghton . . . which
established the law . . . was fundamentally opposed to some
of the views made the basis of the denial of the right of exclusion
under the police power in the earlier cases. .
Holt, J., contributes this:
"It is about time that courts recognize the aesthetic as a factor
in the affairs oi life. Who will dispute that the general welfare
of dwellers in our congested cities is promoted if they be allowed
to have their homes in fit and harmonious or beautiful surround-
ings? Besides preserving and enhancing values it fosters content-
ment, creates a wholesome civic pride, and is productive of better
citizens."3 2
This court points to the aesthetic factor as productive of a finer
citizenship. It does not recognize the creation of such citizen-
ship as a valid end for police power, at the same time ignoring
one of the causes thereof. Other cases do, as we shall see.
The Louisiana court in State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans,33
sustained the exclusion of "Piggly-Wiggly" grocery stores from
residence districts. To do so it overruled prior decisions which
had held such exclusion a matter of mere aesthetics, unsustainable
upon recognized grounds. The court's view was stated thus:
"If by the term 'aesthetic considerations' is meant a regard
merely for outward appearances, for good taste in the matter of
the beauty of the neighborhood itself, we do not observe any sub-
stantial reason for saying that such a consideration is not a matter
of general welfare.
3 4
The negative phrasing does not weaken the recognition of the
aesthetic factor in the court's dictum and decision.
29 (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 159, 160, 214 Pac. 99.
30(1919) 144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885 and 176 N. W. 159.
-1 State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, (1925) 164 Minn. 146, 151, 204
N. W. 569.
32 (1919) 144 Mfinn. 1, 13, 176 N. W. 159.
3 (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440.
3 1' (1923) 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440.
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The refusal to permit an enlargement of a dairy plant con-
trary to the provisions of a zoning law was sustained by the
Wisconsin court in State e'z rel. Carter v. Harper.3 5 To its way
of thinking, the zoned city compares to the unzoned "about as
a well-ordered department store compares to a junk-shop." '  It
is no surprise then to see it characterize the results of zoning as
"material rather than aesthetic in their nature."37  However, the
following language indicates the court's awareness of the prob-
lem of recognition:
"It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in
their nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform
to new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more
refined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be
endured. . . . The rights of property should not be sacrificed to
the pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should
be permitted to plague the average or dominant human sensibili-
ties, well may be pondered.
38
The considered cases from Kansas, Minnesota, Louisiana and
Wisconsin accord as favorable treatment to aesthetic considera-
tions as any others. While the courts deciding them, Kansas ex-
cepted,3 9 have not flat-footedly asserted that considerations of
beauty or aesthetics per se justify use of police power, yet they
do consider them to be of primary importance, if there are other
and more orthodox factors also present. The opinions fail to
analyze the situation with respect to aesthetics. Judicial evalua-
tion is what is now most needed. This should come about in
future cases having to do with further extensions of zoning
power. Yet it must be said that the courts in question have
achieved supposedly desirable results without sacrificing realism.
Others have gotten results, camouflaging their reasons. Still
others, realists, but with more or less static notions, have set
aside the legislative desires, visioning them as attempts "to de-
grade certain trades into the class of nuisances, to prohibit legiti-
mate business on one's own land, and in one's own home..."40
31 (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451.
38 (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 158, 196 N. W. 451.
37 (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W. 451.
3s (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W. 451.
39 To this effect see (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 238, 239: "And order and
beauty in the development of a city has in one case been recognized
as per se sufficient justification for a zoning ordinance. Ware v.
Wichita .. "
40Wm. P. Gest, The Principles of Zoning 11.
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III
The change in judicial attitude toward billboard legislation,
formerly antagonistic but now more or less sympathetic, repre-
sents a desire to reach an aesthetic result while avoiding the term
in giving reasons. Take the Illinois cases. The Hailer Case,1
decided in 1911, held a law prohibiting the erection of billboards
within 500 feet of any public park or boulevard inside the limits
of a city of 100,000 or more, invalid. According to Vickers, C. J.:
"The gist of the argument in support of this law is, that the
police power ought to be extended, both by restriction and com-
pulsion, to the promotion of purely aesthetic purposes, upon the
ground that the general welfare of the public requires it."' 2
He would not extend it to prohibit billboards because they spoil
the view in a park.
In 1915, the Cusack Case"3 decided by the same judge sus-
tained the validity of a Chicago ordinance requiring frontage con-
sents for the erection of billboards in residence districts. The
answer to the bill set up:
"That bill-boards are dangerous to the public health, safety,
morals, welfare and comfort in that they afford protection to dis-
orderly persons, who conceal themselves behind them; that the
space behind bill-boards is used in such manner as to create
nuisances by reason of the shelter and protection afforded by
said bill-boards; that the maintenance of such bill-boards causes
the accumulation of inflammable material, thereby increasing the
danger of fires." 4
Billboards can be prohibited (depending upon thie consents), if
they collect rubbish in a city. The aesthetic issue is dodged.
Preferable to silence is the cautious recognition of Mr. justice
Holmes in the St. Louis Poste7. Case :
"Possibly one or two details, especially the requirement of
conformity to the building line, have aesthetic considerations in
view more obviously than anything else. But as the main burdens
imposed stand on other ground, we should not be prepared to
deny the validity of relatively trifling requirements that did not
look solely to the satisfaction of rudimentary wants that alone
we generally recognize as necessary. "
41Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, (1911)
249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920.
42(1911) 249 Ill. 436, 447, 94 N. E. 920.
43 Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, (1915) 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E.
340, Affirmed under same name, (1917) 242 U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 190,
61 L. Ed. 472.
44(1915) 267 Ill. 344, 346, 347, 108 N. E. 340.
45 St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, (1919) 249 U. S. 269, 39
Sup. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599.
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Mr. Chandler's comment on these cases bears repeating:
"With many protestations and by means of the fantastic argu-
ment that bill-boards are a menace to public safety, the courts have
nevertheless given aid to the movement for protection against
this disfigurement. Has the time not come, or at least is it not
almost here, when the courts will drop the mask of an exclusive
concern for safety and health that in the case of bill-boards is
not real, and frankly approve reasonable regulations of the use
of property in the interest of beauty ?"11
Has the mask-dropping for which he prays occurred? It would
seem not. The courts continue to reach aesthetic results, but
they do so "by basing their decisions on other grounds and mak-
ing the widest possible interpretation of order, safety, health,
morals, and the like."'4 8  The same practice is noted in two
cases which uphold establishment of the one-family house dis-
trict: the Massachusetts court, on the ground that "the mental
welfare of society would be promoted by each family dwelling
in a house by itself ;,4,9 the California court, because such restric-
tions protect "the civic and social values of the American home.""0
IV
Opposed to the view that the police power can impinge upon
property rights on aesthetic grounds is a cloud of witnesses. In
Yozngstozon v. Kahn Buidding Co.,"1 an Ohio case of the nimbus
variety, a non-comprehensive ordinance which excluded apartment
houses from a residence district comprising "merely a small frac-
tion of the entire city" was held invalid. Judge Florence E. Allen
thus states ably the case against aesthetics:
"It is commendable and desirable, but not essential to the
public need, that our aesthetic desires be gratified. Moreover,
authorities in general agree as to the essentials of a public health
program, while the public view as to what is necessary for
aesthetic progress greatly varies. Certain legislatures might
consider that it was more important to cultivate a taste for jazz
than for Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and for
limericks than for Keats. . . .The world would be at continual
seesaw if aesthetic considerations were permitted to govern the
use of the police power. We are therefore remitted to the propo-
sition that the police power is based upon public necessity, and
46 (1919) 249 U. S. 269, 274, 39 Sup. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599.
4 (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 472.
48 Newman F. Baker, Legal Aspects of Zoning 15.
49 Brett v. Brookline, (1924) 250 Mass. 73, 78, 145 N. E. 269.
50 Miller v. Board of Public Works, (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 492, 234
PaC. 381. See Comment (1925) 13 Calif. L. Rev. 417.
51 (1925) 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N. E. 842.
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that the public health, morals, or safety, and not merely aesthetic
interest, must be in danger in order to justify its use."52
The antipathetic Maryland court in Goldnman v. Crzther13
held that the comprehensive zoning ordinance for Baltimore was
void in so far as it "attempts to regulate and restrict the use of
property." Goldman wished to operate a clothing repair shop
in the basement of his four-story house, but was refused a per-
mit under the zoning act. In an opinion particularly unsym-
pathetic toward zoning, after mentioning the "veritable flood
of so-called 'zoning' legislation," Offutt, J. says:
"But the question before us goes much further than that. It
is whether the power to hold, use and enjoy property can be
restricted or taken away by the state under the guise of the police
power for purely aesthetic reasons or for such elastic and inde-
terminate object as the general prosperity without compen-
sation."5 4
Commenting upon the Ware, Civello and Harper Cases, in his
opinion these use restrictions "bore no necessary relation to the
public ...welfare," but in those cases were sustained because
"'repugnant to the aesthetic sensibilities of that part of the public
in whose interest they were drawn." 5
Bond, C. J.'s, dissenting opinion reads:
"If any kind or degree of aesthetic regulation is ever to be
within the legitimate powers of government, the principle con-
trolling it cannot be formulated as yet, and we are not authorized
to declare it to be so. . .But is the Court at liberty to assume
that an aesthetic purpose was the only one, or even that it was
the predominant purpose, in the enactment of the present ordi-
nance?,,6
The dissenting judges 7 differed with the majority as to the proper
function of the court in deciding a police power case. But dif-
fering views of the judicial function often are symptomatic of
.a conflict upon the major problem itself. This is unfortunate
for book law, but so long as judges are human the phenomenon
will exist.
The Texas court,53 thinking it selfishly discriminatory, in 1921
held invalid a Dallas ordinance forbidding the erection of busi-
52 (1925) 112 Ohio St. 654, 661, 662, 148 N. E. 842.
53 (1925) 147 Md. 282, 128 AtI. 50.
54 (1925) 147 Md. 282, 302, 128 Ad. 50.
55 (1925) 147 Md. 28, 305, 128 Atl. 50.
56 (1925) 147 Md. 282, 316, 128 Ad. 50.57 Bond C. J. and Urner, J.,
58 Spann v. City of Dallas, (1921) 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513.
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ness buildings within a residence district "except with the con-
sent of three-fourths of the property owners of the district, and
on the building inspector's approval of the design of the pro-
posed structure." The court said:
"It is doubtless offensive to many people for a store to be
located within a given area where they own residence property.
Others would possibly regard the store as a convenience. An
aesthetic sense might condemn a store building within a residence
district as an alien thing and out of place, or as marring its
architectural symmetry. But it is not the law of this land that
a man may be deprived of the lawful use of his property because
his tastes are not in accord with those of his neighbors.""
This decision was followed and the opinion cited from fully in
the New Jersey case, Ignacihuows v. Risley. 0
Mr. Chandler begins his article with this sentence: "On first
impression no two terms would seem to be more incongruous than
beauty and the law."81  So far as the cases just quoted from
are concerned, the impression persists. And notes and coin-
ments from law periodicals pretty unanimously essay the answer
yes to our major question. In discussing "the constitutionality
of building lines for aesthetic purposes," 2 a note editor has said:
"Though it is recognized that provisions incidentally aesthetic
will not vitiate otherwise valid restrictions, no court, it seems,
has yet gone so far as to sustain legislation whose sole object
is to promote the aesthetic. ...
Obviously as civilization advances, the public aesthetic
sense will become more and more compelling. ..
The statement is accurate in 1929, for civilization advances
gradually.
In commenting upon the right of municipal corporations to
zone,64 a case comment editor remarks that:
"The zoning cases have also displayed a tendency to justify
zoning under the police power verbiage. With two exceptions
they deprecate argument based on esthetic considerations, although
it is a matter of common knowledge that esthetic considerations
are very powerful motives with the city council which enacts
the zoning law." 5
We find it stated by Miss Werner that "aesthetic considerations
39(1921) 111 Tex. 350, 358, 235 S. W. 513.
60(1923) 98 N. J. L. 712, 121 Atl. 783.
61 (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 472.
62 (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 419.
83 (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 419, 420, 422.
64 (1925) 13 Calif. L. Rev. 417.
65 (1925) 13 Calif. L. Rev. 417, 418.
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as such do not furnish sufficient grounds for imposing restric-
tions on the use of private property under the police power ;"
and by Williams, that:
"Under our state constitutions the police power cannot be
used to promote civic beauty; although if the main purpose of
the measure in question justifies the employment of that power,
the promotion of beauty may be a subsidiary consideration.""
McQuillin says:
"Undoubtedly the law has undergone a decided change in this
respect in recent years. However, so far as it appears from the
decided cases, apart from general expressions on the subject,
restrictions on the use of property contained in zoning regulations
solely for purely aesthetic purposes are regarded as invasions
of private property rights."68
V
Before stating conclusions, it will be well to notice predictions
as to the trend of the cases. Well-considered comments discern
"a decided tendency to give ... more weight" 9 to aesthetic con-
siderations, a tendency "to broaden the scope of the police power
and to use it to accomplish aesthetic purposes whenever in sound
public policy there is reason to do so.' '"° However, "the present
trend of authority does not favor the sufficiency of aesthetic
grounds as a sole justification for zoning laws."71 Newman F.
Baker predicts:
"... that the time is not distant when the courts of our
country will hold that reasonable legislation affecting the property
of the individuals will be considered constitutional if passed to
promote the well-being of the people by making their surround-
ings more attractive, their lot more contented, and by inspiring
a greater degree of civic pride."
7 2
And McQuillin believes aesthetic legislation
"is destined to increase with the years, and in the develop-
ment of the law in this respect courts will incline more and more
to give a broader interpretation to such regulations, and finally
sanction restrictions imposed solely to advance material attrac-
tiveness and artistic beauty."
73
66 Werner, The Constitutionality of Zoning Regulations 22.
67 Frank Backus Williams, The Law of City Planning and Zon-
ing 393, 394. "A very worthy text-book," per O'Niell C. J. in State
ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440.
68 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 1049.
69 (1920) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 202.
70 (1920) 30 Yale L. J. 171, 173.
71 (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 640, 644.72 Baker, Legal Aspects of Zoning 27.
733 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 943. (1925) 25 Col.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. A categorical reply cannot be given to Question (a).
What is decided in the cases must be distinguished from what is
said. The cases upholding use restrictions upon apartment houses
and stores, in their decisions, seem to recognize the aesthetic as
an important justifying factor. Another discernible factor is
conservation of property values.7' If this more tangible consid-
eration affords a valid reason for exercising police power,70 its
presence along with the aesthetic prevents saying that aesthetic
considerations alone are sufficient.
2. Where a regulation simply affects the design of ordinary
buildings in ordinary places, the affirmative answer 8 to Question
(a) seems correct at present. The boulevard billboard decision77
bears out this conclusion.
3. The language in the cases upholding rigorous use restric-
tions flirts with aesthetics without indicating how seriously.* The
Wichita Case-, says that considerations of this nature alone justify
use of the police power, but the dictum is weakened because the
court rested its decision on the ordinary grounds as well.
4. Those use cases which deny the power to exclude business
from residence districts say the result follows because the police
power cannot be used to accomplish exclusively aesthetic ends.
L. Rev. 1047, 1052: "Constitutionality in New York depends not on
general principles but on individual hardships and on whether the court
feels that the community is ready to impose them on the individual.
Such a standard is an evershifting standard, and to prophesy success-
fully it behooves one to watch the trend of thought in ordinary men
and women as to the propriety of greater refinements in zoning. For
courts reflect communal thought on this question."
74J. S. Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Prop-
erty, (1925) 9 MINNEsOtA LAW RmIw 518 and 593, 626: ". . . what
has been called by the courts aesthetic is in reality economic. If this
be true, it follows that the economic promotes the general welfare and
the general welfare is the leading object for the use of the police
power."
Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, (1924) 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 835, 840: "Stabilization of property values has been frequently
mentioned as one of the purposes of zoning which form its consti-
tutional basis. .. "
(1924) 12 Calif. L. Rev. 428, 430: "But the primary purpose of these
regulations, although the courts would no doubt be loath to admit it.
would seem to be essentially economic."
75 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 944.
76 M. T. Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds,
(1928) 37 Yale L. 3. 407, 410.
77 Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, (1911) 249
Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920.
78 (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99.
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If the premise is correct, the broad gauge courts necessarily have
decided otherwise. But, as suggested above, this view of their
decisions cannot positively be stated and only Kansas has even
said that it can. The difficulty appears to be one of "definition, '""
though really it goes more deeply than that, to the fundamental
judicial attitude toward "property."
5. The answer to Question (b) is clear: the presence of
aesthetic considerations does not invalidate a law sustainable on
ordinary police grounds. Here, the problem of definition or
of relativity" recurs. The same regulation may be sustained un-
der (a) by a court answering (a) negatively, under (b) by a
court answering (a) affirmatively, independently of (a) or (b)
by a complete ignoring of the aesthetic factor."1
6. The concept that the police power is limited strictly to
the protection of the public health, safety, morals is outgrown.
But the power is so vast and its exercise so fraught with possi-
bilities7 of abuse, that those courts which conceive it dynamically
cling to the terms of the past while giving them enlarged mean-
ing. Progress lies along the path of realism, when each exercise
of power shall be furnished its own well-fitted verbal raiment
unhidden by the venerable cloak fashioned of safety and health
and morals.
7JAlfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, (1924) 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 835, 857: "Aesthetic is a word which needs more clear-cut precise
definition, if it is to be used as a term of constitutional law." The remainder
of the paragraph may contain antecedent questioning of the efficaciousness
of the present article.
80 See quotation to which note 38 is appended.
813 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 1048: "Zoning cases
are replete with these seeming inconsistent phrases. We can learn only what
was really decided by understanding the facts of the particular case and the
judgment given because the facts were thus and so."
